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The Internal Market and National Security: 
Harmonisation, Impact and Reform of the EU Directive 
on Intra-Community Transfers of Defence Products 
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1. Introduction  
Whilst the Internal Market has been operational for decades with regard to all other goods, 
Member States have historically restricted the free movement of defence products within the 
EU. Law and practice in this field appears to operate in a parallel universe in which the 
Internal Market does not exist. National licencing laws and policies have treated ‘intra-
Union’ transfers, that is, the transmission or movement of a defence-related product from a 
supplier in one Member State to a recipient in another,1 as equivalent to exports to third 
countries outside the EU. A principal concern is the view that the absence of controls on 
transfers within the EU could exacerbate risks of illicit exports outside the EU, threatening 
national security and foreign policy interests. Disproportionate licencing requirements have 
incurred significant costs and delays, creating barriers to trade. However, in 2009, the EU 
adopted its “Defence Package”, a key component of which is the Intra-Community Transfers 
Directive (ICT) 2009/43/EC introducing a harmonised transfer licencing and certification 
regime.2 Reacting to this legislative development, the objective of this article is twofold. 
First, it aims to address an important gap in existing literature by offering a first legal 
analysis3 of transfers in their historical context,4 the strengths and shortcomings of the ICT’s 
*Professor of European Law and Policy and Director of the Institute of European Law, University of 
Birmingham. **Lecturer in Law, University of Bristol. The authors wish to thank Phil Syrpis and Albert 
Sánchez-Graells (University of Bristol), Anthony Arnull (University of Birmingham), Baudouin Heuninckx 
(Royal Belgian Air Force), and the participants of a workshop at the 46th UACES Conference in Bilbao in 
September 2015 for useful comments on a previous version of this paper. Any mistakes, however, are ours.  
1 Based on the definition of ‘transfer’ in Article 3(2) Directive 2009/43/EC of the European Parliament and of 
the Council of 6 May 2009 simplifying terms and conditions of transfers of defence-related products within the 
Community [2009] OJ L146/1. The (August) 2009 ICT still uses the term ‘Community’ having preceded the 
(December) 2009 Treaty of Lisbon replacing the term ‘European Community’ with the term ‘European Union’. 
However, the authors refer to ‘intra-Union transfer’ to reflect the Lisbon changes. 
2 The “Defence Package” consists of: the ICT; Directive 2009/81/EC of the European Parliament and of the 
Council of 13 July 2009 on the coordination of procedures for the award of certain works contracts, supply 
contracts and service contracts by contracting authorities or entities in the fields of defence and security; and 
amending Directives 2004/17/EC and 2004/18/EC [2009] OJ L216/76 and Commission Communication A 
Strategy for a Stronger and More Competitive European Defence Industry COM (2007)764 final, introduced to 
academia by Koutrakos, “The Commission’s ‘defence package” (2008) 33 EL Rev 1-2. Directive 2009/81/EC, 
arguably the most significant part of the Package, has been discussed in numerous publications including: 
Trybus, “The tailor-made EU Defence and Security Procurement Directive: limitation, flexibility, description, 
and substitution” (2013) 39 EL Rev 3-29 and Trybus, Buying Defence and Security in Europe: the EU Defence 
and Security Procurement Directive in Context (CUP, Cambridge 2014). See also: Heuninckx, “The EU 
Defence and Security Procurement Directive: Trick or Treat?” (2011) 20 PPL Rev 9. 
3 For a discussion in the political science/security studies literature, see Masson, Marta, Léger and Lundmark, 
“The “Transfer Directive”: perceptions in European countries and recommendations”, researches & documents, 
Fondation pour la reserche stratégique, No. 04/2010. Available at: 
<https://www.frstrategie.org/publications/recherches-documents/web/documents/2010/201004.pdf> (last visited 
19 March 2016); Mölling, “Options for an EU regime on intra-Community transfers of defence goods” in 
Keohane (ed.), Towards a European Defence Market, Chaillot Paper 113 (EU Institute of Security Studies: 
Paris, 2008) and Ingels, “The Intra-EU Defence Trade Directive: Positive Goals” in Bailes, Depauw and Baum 
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provisions in light of their intended objectives and impact on national laws and practices.5 
This pre-empts a 2016 review of the ICT which is still ongoing and may be accompanied by a 
legislative proposal for reform. 6  Second, this article provides a case study of the EU’s 
approach to harmonisation in an area comprising diverse national security interests and 
industrial capacities as part of an evolving EU competence in the field of armaments.   
 This article begins by examining the economic and historical context of transfers 
within the broader framework of EU law (Section 2). It then analyses the ICT’s scope 
(Section 3), transfers and licences (Section 4), end-use controls (Section 5), certification 
(Section 6) and additional safeguards (Section 7) before offering some conclusions (Section 
8). It is argued that whilst the ICT constitutes a significant first step towards reducing barriers 
to free movement of defence goods within the EU, the ICT’s approach to harmonisation has 
so far adversely impacted the operational effectiveness of the regime. The article offers a 
strategic assessment of the prospects for reform under a revised ICT. 
 
2. Context 
The defence industries of several EU Member States are part of a global armaments market in 
which, in 2014, the top 100 defence producers sold goods and services worth US$401 
billion.7 Companies in the so-called ‘Big Six’ Member States, namely France, Germany, 
Italy, Spain, Sweden and the UK, sell to their respective governments, to a lesser extent to 
other Member States, and export to third countries.8 Further, most Member States have at 
least niche capacities and participate in European and global supply chains. Therefore, the 
ability of Member States and companies to transfer defence products expeditiously with 
(eds.) The EU defence Market: Balancing Effectiveness with Responsibility (Flemish Peace Institute: Brussels, 
2011). For an overview in a legal context, see Trybus, Buying Defence and Security in Europe, ibid., at 139-156. 
4 Drawing on available data from UNISYS, ‘Intra-Community Transfers of Defence Products’, Final Report of 
the Study ‘Assessment of Community initiatives related to intra-community transfers of defence products’, 
Brussels, February 2005 (study commissioned for the European Commission) (UNISYS) to discern the status 
quo ante. This study is no longer available at the time of writing but remains on file. The analysis also draws on 
the 2007 Commission Impact Assessment, Commission, ‘Commission Staff Working Document, Accompanying 
document to the Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council on simplifying terms 
and conditions of transfers of defence-related products within the Community, Impact Assessment, SEC (2007), 
1593, for the intended impact. 
5 Informed by Commission, Report from the Commission to the European Parliament and the Council on 
transposition of Directive 2009/43/EC simplifying terms and conditions for transfer of defence-related products 
within the EU, COM(2012) 359final to discern the ICT’s formal transposition into national laws and Mampaey, 
Moreau, Quéau and Seniora, Final Report, Study on the Implementation of Directive 2009/43/EC on Transfers 
of Defence-related Products, Group for Research and Information on Peace and Security (GRIP) (prepared for 
the European Commission) 2014 for the practical impact on national laws until 2014: 
<http://www.grip.org/sites/grip.org/files/RAPPORTS/2014/Study%20on%20the%20implementation%20of%20
Directive%20200943EC%20on%20transfers%20of%20defence-related%20products.pdf> (last visited 14 June 
2016). The most recent data and analysis is provided in the European Parliament Directorate-General for 
External Policies Policy Department’s Report – The impact of the ‘defence package’ Directives on European 
Defence 2015, 
<http://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/STUD/2015/549044/EXPO_STU(2015)549044_EN.pdf> [last 
visited 29 March 2016]. Information was also collected during semi-structured interviews conducted with Mr 
Ian Bendelow, Department for Business, Innovation and Skills (UK), as well as other informal discussions with 
officials in certain Member States including Germany. 
6 Recital 41 and Article 17 ICT.  
7  Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) Press Release, 14 December 2014: 
<http://www.sipri.org/media/pressreleases/2014/SIPRI-Top-100-December-2014> (last visited 19 March 2016). 
The list contains many EU-based companies. The European defence industries have an estimated annual 
turnover of €55 billion and employ approximately 300,000 people. See also 2007 figures in COM (2007)764 
supra note 2, at 2, also indicating that 20 years ago these figures were almost twice as high. 
8 For a discussion of this grouping, see Trybus, Buying Defence and Security in Europe, supra note 2, at 26. 
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proportionate controls is an important contributor to the competitiveness and, indeed, survival 
of the European defence industries.  
 
2.1. The status quo ante: intra-Union transfers prior to the ICT 
For many years, the Commission has sought to prioritise intra-Union transfers as part of the 
development of a more competitive EU defence market.9 However, there had been no general 
EU-wide regime for the intra-Union transfer of defence-related products.10 Member States 
instituted their own national policies, legislation and practices which formally treated the 
internal transfer of defence products within the EU and their export to third countries without 
distinction.11 National ex ante export licences would be required in both instances.12 To this 
extent, national rules were not specifically adapted to differentiate Internal Market law 
obligations and any other legal obligations with regard to exports. Thus, measures that might 
otherwise be appropriate for export risks, such as potential diversion to third parties involved 
in conflict or terrorism, were equally applied to transfers to allied and generally peaceful 
Member States within a deeply integrated EU. The absence of free movement of defence 
goods within the EU was criticised not least by the European defence industries.13 Whilst 
licence applications for export to other EU or NATO members were most likely subject to 
less scrutiny than exports to other countries,14 the formal existence of many different laws 
was, in itself, “a serious burden for intra-[Union] transfers” exacerbated by their publication 
alongside licencing policies (if published) in different languages.15  
Numerous barriers to trade could also be identified. Member States used different 
national and international lists for the control of armaments to determine the scope of 
coverage of licences.16 Most national laws did not specify detailed or transparent licencing 
criteria.17 Determinations were, therefore, at the absolute discretion of licencing authorities.18 
Further, more than one body could be designated with licencing approval responsibility 
including requirements to consult other bodies prior to approval.19 Stages in the required 
licencing procedures also varied.20 Moreover, certain national laws required that additional 
(pre-)licences be obtained or a fee paid before licences could be approved.21 The processes 
for certifying reliable defence companies were also based on varying national practices.22 
Finally, in certain Member States, licences could be obtained for several years covering 
9 See The Challenges Facing the European Defence-Related Industry, A Contribution for Action at European 
Level COM(1996)10 final, at 19; Implementing European Union Strategy on Defence-Related Industries COM 
(1997)583 final, Annex I: Draft Common Position on Framing a European Armaments Policy, Article 5; Annex 
II: Action Plan; and Towards a European Union Defence Equipment Policy COM (2003)113 final at 13.  
10 By contrast, see Council Regulation 428/2009/EC setting up a Community regime for the control of exports, 
transfer, brokering and transit of dual-use items (recast) [2009] OJ L134/1. 
11 Impact Assessment, supra note 4, at 4. 
12 UNISYS, supra note 4, at 12; Impact Assessment, ibid., at 13. 
13 See the President of the European Defence Industries Group Corrado Antonini: “Political Harmonisation and 
Consolidation”, EMP conference on the Future of the European Defence Industry, Brussels, 10-11 December 
2003 as cited in UNISYS, ibid., at 80. 
14 See, for instance, the German practice prior to the adoption of the ICT in Masson, Marta, Léger, and 
Lundmark, ‘The “Transfer Directive”’, supra note 3, at 18. For a useful analysis of national licencing regimes 
prior to the ICT, see ibid 15-32 and UNISYS, supra note 4, at 8-36 and Annex D. 
15 UNISYS, ibid., at 12 also at 59 and 64. 
16 Ibid., at 9. See also: Mölling, supra note 3, at 58. 
17 UNISYS, supra note 4, at 61. 
18 Impact Assessment, note 4, at 14. 
19 UNISYS, supra note 4, at 13, 15-16 and 60-61 and Impact Assessment, supra note 4, at 13. 
20 UNISYS, ibid., at 17-24. See also: Mölling, supra note 3, at 58. 
21 UNISYS, supra note 4, at 61; Impact Assessment, supra note 4, at 14. 
22 Mölling, supra note 3, at 59. 
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multiple shipments whereas in others, licences were required for every single shipment.23 
Time limits for licence expirations also varied. 24  Renewals were often possible but 
requirements for renewal and the permissible length of renewals also differed.25  
These issues resulted in significant administrative burdens, generating long lead 
times, in some cases up to several months. 26  Therefore, even companies transferring 
components between subsidiaries located in several countries had to comply with variable 
regimes.27 It is difficult to assess the indirect costs on the defence industries overall, but the 
direct costs of licencing amount to hundreds of millions of Euros.28 These costs are stark 
considering that licences were rarely refused. In 2003, out of 12,627 licence applications,29 
only 15 were refused, all in the Baltic States.30 Whilst, as will be discussed in Section 4, there 
may be exceptional instances in which licencing measures may be justified, the above 
indicates that licensing practices have generally been disproportionate.31  
However, some momentum towards liberalisation in this area resulted from the 1998 
intergovernmental Letter of Intent (LoI) initiative, to which the ‘Big-Six’ defence industrial 
Member States are currently signatories. 32  Under the LoI, attempts had been made to 
introduce the ‘Global Project Licence’ removing the need for specific authorisations to 
transfer products between LoI partners participating in collaborative projects.33 However, the 
LoI initiative has not been fully executed in practice and with limited results to date.34  
In 2006, the EU launched a Consultation Paper on intra-Community transfers.35 This 
precipitated the 2007 Impact Assessment36 and proposal for a Directive.37 The status quo was 
23 UNISYS, supra note 4, at 62. 
24 Ibid. 
25 UNISYS, supra note 4, at 62. 
26 Ibid., at 5; Impact Assessment, supra note 4, at 14 and Mölling, supra note 3, at 61-62, 68. 
27 Impact Assessment, supra note 4, at 4. 
28 UNISYS, supra note 4, at 112 estimates the indirect costs related to the obstacles to intra-Union transfers at 
€2.73 billion. The estimated direct costs for the 12,627 licence procedures conducted in 2003 amounted to €238 
million (ibid.).  
29 With an overall value of €8.9 billion for conventional defence products delivered between the then 25 EU 
Member States: UNISYS, supra note 4, at 94. This represents approximately 31.4 per cent of all transfers, with 
the remainder being exports to third countries (ibid., 95). UNISYS reports that this percentage is in line with the 
turnover reported by large European enterprises: e.g. Thales reports a military turnover of 30 per cent inside the 
EU and 70 per cent outside. Ibid at fn 79 citing “Interview D. L. August 2004”.   
30 UNISYS, ibid., at 94: six in Estonia, six in Latvia and three in Lithuania. 
31 Impact Assessment, supra note 4, at 4: “[t]his patchwork of licencing requirements - and the corresponding 
administrative burden – clearly appear to be out of proportion with actual control needs”, and at 13: “Intra-
community transfers of defence-related goods hindered by cumbersome and disproportionate procedures 
[emphasis added].” 
32 Letter of Intent between the Defence Ministers of the UK, France, Germany, Italy, Spain and Sweden on 
Measures to facilitate the Restructuring of the European Defence Industry signed in London, 6 July 1998. The 
LoI was formalised under a Framework Agreement between The French Republic, The Federal Republic of 
Germany, The Italian Republic, The Kingdom of Spain, The Kingdom of Sweden and The United Kingdom of 
Great Britain and Northern Ireland Concerning Measures to Facilitate the Restructuring and Operation of the 
European Defence Industry signed during the Farnborough Air Show on 27 July 2000. The Framework 
Agreement entered into force on 2 October 2003. For a general discussion of the LoI, see Trybus, Buying 
Defence and Security in Europe, supra note 2, at 225-231.  
33 Article 7, Framework Agreement. 
34 Impact Assessment, supra note 4, at 9 and 18. 
35 Commission, Consultation Paper on the Intra-Community Circulation of Products for the Defence of Member 
States, 21 March 2006, Brussels, ENTR/C. 
36 Supra note 4. 
37 Commission, Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council on simplifying terms 
and conditions of transfers of defence-related products within the Community COM(2007)765 final. 
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rejected due to the perceived disadvantages.38 The Commission opted for a Directive rather 
than a Regulation based on the “primary responsibility” of Member States for simplification 
of licencing and the general sensitivity of defence.39 On 6 May 2009, the ICT was adopted. 
Member States had until 30 June 2011 for transposition.40 However, national provisions did 
not have to enter into effect until 30 June 2012, allowing a period in which to “foster mutual 
trust” and evaluate progress based on a Commission report. 41 In 2012, the Commission 
reported incomplete transposition42 and initially launched infringement proceedings against 
seven Member States.43 All Member States have now formally transposed the ICT.44  
 
2.2. Competence to regulate armaments and harmonisation under the TFEU 
Given that transfers of defence products may implicate national security and foreign policy 
considerations, a central issue concerns both the EU’s competence to act and the nature and 
scope of harmonisation in this field. 
 
2.2.1 Competence 
One question that might be raised is whether the ICT is compatible with primary EU law 
because it purports to regulate measures that are deemed to be prima facie incompatible with 
the EU Treaties.45 The ICT was adopted under Article 114 TFEU (ex 95 EC) which enables 
EU legislation that harmonises relevant national laws for the establishment and functioning of 
the Internal Market. 46  Harmonisation under EU law is conventionally understood as the 
institution of common EU rules to remove ‘lawful’ barriers to trade, that is, nationally diverse 
measures which are prima facie incompatible with the EU Treaties but which could 
exceptionally be justified, for example, on public health or security grounds. 47  If a 
harmonisation Directive is enacted to provide rules which protect such interests, recourse to 
Article 36 TFEU is precluded. 48  If harmonisation is not complete, Member States may 
continue to have recourse to Article 36 TFEU.49  
 Applied to the ICT, it is clear that defence-related products are goods for the purposes 
of EU law which impact the internal market. 50  Onerous licencing requirements may 
38 Identified as: the continued fragmentation of the market along national lines; the delay of necessary defence 
industry consolidation; the risks of discrimination between operators covered by intergovernmental regimes 
outside the EU and other EU operators; the difficulty of integrating Small and Medium Sized Enterprises 
(“SMEs”) from new Member States in supply chains; the gradual technological decline as the critical mass of 
industries remained insufficient; the progressive exclusion from the highest value-added market segments; and, 
finally, the resulting erosion of competitiveness, sanctioned by loss of market share in both EU and third 
countries. See Impact Assessment, supra note 4, at 44. 
39 COM (2007)765 final supra note 37, at 8. 
40 Article 18(1) ICT. 
41 See Recital 40, Articles 17(1) and 18(1) ICT. 
42  The Transposition Report, supra note 4, at 15-19 reported in 2012 that 20 Member States had fully 
transposed, one had partially, six were expectant and one had not communicated transposition. 
43 Transposition Report, ibid, at 5. 
44 Croatia only joined the Union in 2013 in full compliance with the entire acquis.  
45 The authors are grateful to Phil Syrpis and Baudouin Heuninckx for this observation. On the relationship 
between secondary and primary EU law generally, see Syrpis, “The Relationship between Primary and 
Secondary Law in the EU” (2015) 52 CML Rev 461-488.  
46 Preamble and Recital 43 ICT.  
47 Alternatively, on the basis of the ‘Cassis de Dijon’ mandatory requirements or overriding public interest 
grounds as recognised in REWE Zentrale AG v. Bundesmonopolverwaltung für Branntwein (Case 120/78) 
[1979] ECR 649, [1979] 3 CMLR 494.  
48 Campus Oil (72/83) [1984] ECR 2727, para.21. 
49 Denkavit (39/90) [1991] ECR I-3069, para.19. 
50 Recital 2 ICT. Armaments can be valued in money and can be the subject of commercial transactions. See the 
definition of goods in Commission v. Italy (‘Arts Treasures’) (Case 7/68) [1968] ECR 423, 429.  
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constitute measures having equivalent effect to quantitative restrictions on exports contrary to 
Article 35 TFEU.51 Such measures are thus prima facie incompatible with EU law unless 
justified under Article 36 TFEU. The ICT considers harmonisation to be necessary because 
“direct” application of the free movement principles alone is insufficient to remove national 
restrictions in light of their potential to be justified under Article 36 or 346 TFEU.52 Yet, the 
ICT continues to recognise that its ICT’s application remains subject to Articles 36 (and 346 
TFEU).53 It is arguable that the ICT’s scope and that of Article 36 TFEU are reconcilable on 
the basis that the ICT does not purport to limit the scope of Article 36 TFEU but rather 
attempts to provide a harmonised set of certain measures that would otherwise be justifiable 
under Article 36 TFEU but which the ICT now regulates, subject to the other principles of 
EU law, for example, proportionality.54 This does not constitute an “indirect” attempt to limit 
the scope of the Treaties because the ICT does not preclude the possibility to continue to 
place further national restrictions on the measures regulated in the ICT or to adopt certain 
other measures, provided these are justified under Article 36 TFEU. Rather, Member States 
must identify why their public security interests cannot be sufficiently protected through 
compliance with a Directive intended to harmonise national measures whose continuing 
application would otherwise lead to broad public security exemptions restricting the internal 
market. An outstanding difficulty is that whilst the ICT indicates that measures have the 
“potential” to be justified under Article 36 (or 346) TFEU, prior CJEU case law had not 
provided a clear indication as to what kinds of measure can be justified under Article 36 
TFEU and the level of scrutiny to be applied. So far, EU case law has only indicated that 
national licencing measures applicable to the import, export and transit of dual-use goods 
(rather than defence products) could be justified on grounds of public security.55  
 This uncertainty may be further exacerbated by the fact that, unusually, the ICT seeks 
to harmonise national measures justified not only under Article 36 TFEU within the scope of 
the Treaties but also under Article 346 TFEU outside the Treaties altogether.56 Prior to the 
ICT, Member States considered that measures concerning armaments, including licencing in 
relation to transfers, are automatically and categorically excluded from the TFEU altogether 
under Article 346 TFEU57 on the basis that such measures affect Member States’ essential 
security interests. 58 However, the absence of CJEU case law on the transfer of defence 
51 This was repeatedly highlighted by the Commission in the Consultation Paper supra note 35 at 3 and 
COM(2007)765 final supra note 37, at 19. On these administrative burdens generally, see Section 2.1 above.  
52 Recitals 2 and 5 ICT. 
53 Recitals 5, 13 and Article 1(3) ICT.  
54 The authors are grateful to Albert Sanchez-Graells for discussing the extent to which the ICT may be said to 
“channel” or provide certain “modes of application” for, rather than limit the application of, Article 36 TFEU ”. 
55 Criminal Proceedings against Aimé Richardt and Les Accessoires Scientifiques SNC (367/89) [1991] ECR I-
4621; Fritz Werner Industrie-Ausrüstungen GmbH v. Germany (70/94) [1995] ECR I-3989 and Criminal 
Proceedings against Peter Leifer (83/94) [1995] ECR I-3231. See generally Koutrakos, EU International 
Relations Law (Hart: Oxford, 2006) 419-428. 
56 Directive 2009/81/EC on procurement is not a direct comparator. Directive 2009/81/EC is defined in relevant 
parts by reference to Article 346 TFEU. However, its primary objective is not to harmonise procurement falling 
within the scope of Article 36 or 346 TFEU where no prior harmonisation existed. Rather, its objective is to 
harmonise procedures for the award of contracts that were, in theory, always subject to specific EU Internal 
Market rules and did not require recourse to an exception (but for which Member States routinely and 
erroneously invoked Article 346 TFEU).  
57 Whilst difficult to empirically validate, this assessment was made by UNISYS, supra note 4, at 70-72 and the 
Impact Assessment, supra note 4, at 19.  
58 More specifically, Article 346(1)(b) TFEU which provides: “[…] any Member State may take such measures 
as it considers necessary for the protection of the essential interests of its security which are connected with the 
production of or trade in arms, munitions and war material; such measures shall not adversely affect the 
conditions of competition in the internal market regarding products which are not intended for specifically 
military purposes […]” In 1958, the Council compiled a list of armaments to which Article 346(1)(b) TFEU 
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products renders it unclear why Member States would not consider such measures justified 
under Article 36 TFEU, at least in the first instance and which similarly fails to clearly 
delimit the relationship between Article 36 and 346 TFEU.59 Outside the specific context of 
transfers, for example in the area of defence procurement, the CJEU continues to refine its 
general interpretation that Article 346 TFEU does not represent an automatic or categorical 
exclusion of trade in defence products from the otherwise applicable TFEU.60 Similar to the 
free movement exceptions such as Article 36 TFEU, Article 346 TFEU is subject to a narrow 
interpretation.61 Member States must specifically invoke Article 346 TFEU and prove that a 
situation justifying its use exists. In the Commission’s view, it is not possible to infer from 
Article 346 TFEU that there is a general proviso inherent in the TFEU covering all measures 
taken by Member States and that it has no effect on its legislative power to adopt harmonising 
legislation in the area of defence product transfers.62 Again, it could argued that the ICT 
attempts to harmonise certain measures that Member States might have previously sought to 
justify under Article 346 TFEU without denying the possibility to continue to invoke Article 
346 TFEU where security interests cannot be protected through the ICT’s application. 
Notwithstanding, the ICT exposes continuing uncertainty surrounding the relationship 
between Article 36 and 346 TFEU.  
 On balance, then, it might be suggested that it is better to have a Directive that seeks 
to reduce the effect of lawful restrictions through EU measures than leaving restrictive 
national measures in place uncontrolled. Member States would no loner need to introduce or 
maintain other restrictions unless exceptionally required by Articles 36 or 346 TFEU. 63 
Ultimately, it should also be acknowledged that, in practice, it is questionable whether the 
compatibility of the ICT with the EU Treaties would be challenged. There is no evidence to 
suggest that suppliers brought such challenges against national transfer measures before the 
ICT and Member States appear to accept the legal bases on which the ICT was adopted. 
applies. See Council-Decision 298/58 of 15 April 1958 (not published). On Article 346 TFEU in detail: Trybus, 
Buying Defence and Security in Europe, supra note 2, at 87-128; Trybus, European Union Law and Defence 
Integration (Hart: Oxford, 2005), Chapter 5 and Trybus, “The EC Treaty as an instrument of European defence 
integration: judicial scrutiny of defence and security exceptions” (2002) 39 CML Rev 1347-1372. See also the 
interpretations of Koutrakos, “The Application of EC law to Defence Industries—Changing Interpretations of 
Article 296 EC” in Barnard and Odudu (eds.), The Outer Limits of European Union Law (Hart: Oxford, 2009), 
at 307-328 and Pourbaix, “The Future Scope of Application of Article 346 TFEU” (2011) 20 PPL Rev 1-8. On 
the 1958 List see Trybus, “On the list under Article 296 EC” (2003) 12 PPL Rev NA15-20 and Buying Defence 
and Security in Europe, ibid., at 88-104 (including a version of the 1958 List). 
59 It has been argued that Article 346 TFEU is a special national security derogation for armaments superseding 
the public security justification of Article 36 TFEU: Trybus, European Union Law and Defence Integration, 
supra note 53, at 166. For the view that Article 346 TFEU is not lex specialis to Article 36 TFEU, see 
Koutrakos, Trade, Foreign Policy and Defence in EU Constitutional Law: The Legal Regulation of Sanctions, 
Exports of Dual-use Goods and Armaments (Hart Oxford 2001) 188. 
60 Commission v. Spain (C-414/97) [1999] ECR I-5585, [2000] 2 CMLR 4. This interpretation was reiterated in 
a 2006 Commission Interpretative Communication: Commission, ‘Interpretative Communication on the 
Application of Article 296 of the Treaty in the field of defence procurement’ (Communication) COM (2006)779 
final. This position has been confirmed and further refined in subsequent judgments: See the Agusta judgments 
(Commission v. Italy (C-337/05) [2008] ECR I-2173 and Commission v. Italy (C-157/06) [2008] ECR I-7313); 
the Military Exports judgments (Commission v. Finland (C-284/05) [2009] ECR I-11705; Commission v. 
Sweden (C-294/05) [2009] ECR I-11777; Commission v. Italy (C-387/05) [2009] ECR I-11831; Commission v. 
Greece (C-409/05) [2009] ECR I-11859; Commission v. Denmark (C-461/05) [2009] ECR I-11887; 
Commission v. Portugal (C-38/06) [2010] ECR I-1569; Commission v. Italy (C-239/06) [2009] ECR I-11913) 
and Finnish Turntables (Insinööritoimisto InsTiimi Oy (C-615/10), ECLI:EU:C:2012:324). 
61 Johnston (222/84) [1986] ECR 1651, [1986] 3 CMLR 240, para. 26. See also Salgoil (C-13/98) [1968] ECR 
453, 463, [1969] CMLR 181, 192 and Commission v. Italy (C-7/68) [1968] ECR 633, 644.    
62 Impact assessment, supra note 4, at 19-20 citing Opinion of Mr Advocate General La Pergola, Case C- 
273/97, Angela Maria Sirdar v The Army Board and Secretary of State for Defence, point 11. 
63 Recital 13 ICT.  
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Further, the EU legislator’s choice of a Directive is consistent with practice in relation to 
licensing and transfers in other related areas such as firearms and explosives for civil use.64 
The ICT also mirrors calls for action to regulate transfers in the context of dual-use goods. 
For example, the EU has adopted a Regulation establishing a common set of EU rules for the 
export of dual-use goods.65 However, it has been criticised that the Regulation continues to 
enable Member States to impose restrictive controls on intra-EU transfers of dual-use goods 
and refers to the ICT as a potential model on which to base future harmonisation.66  
 
2.2.2. Nature and scope of harmonisation 
The above has considered the EU’s competence to harmonise measures operating in the area 
of national security through the ICT. The key purported objective of harmonisation is to 
simplify intra-Union transfers.67 However, it is questionable to what extent the ICT achieves 
real substantive harmonisation. Simplification may address the complexity of national 
licencing measures by standardising the types of licence that must be used. However, as will 
be discussed, this does not address other equally, if not more, restrictive barriers to trade, a 
prime example being onerous and restrictive licencing conditions, the national diversity of 
which was criticised in Section 2.1. This issue is compounded by the fact that the ICT does 
not fully address the underlying causes of complexity and diversity. Short of the EU adopting 
EU-wide comprehensive policies to coordinate both the transfer and export of defence 
products, the ICT’s default position is largely to accommodate rather than systematically 
address these concerns through its provisions. An important limitation of the ICT’s scope is 
that harmonisation of transfer rules and procedures is said to be without prejudice to: Member 
State policies regarding the transfer of defence-related products; 68  Member States’ 
international obligations or commitments;69 and Member States’ policies on the export of 
defence-related products.70 Consequently, as will be discussed in Section 4, Member States 
therefore retain considerable discretion to determine the terms, conditions and products 
applicable for each type of licence including export limitations. National controls on exports 
to third countries continue to remain a key organising construct which conditions the ICT 
regime. 71 In short, the simplification achieved through standardised licencing is to some 
extent undermined by the continuing diversity of national approaches on key issues left to 
64 Council Directive 91/477/EEC on control of the acquisition and possession of weapons [1991] OJ L 256/51 
and Council Directive 93/15/EEC on the harmonization of the provisions relating to the placing on the market 
and supervision of explosives for civil uses [1993] OJ L 121/20. The ICT is without prejudice to these 
Directives. See Recital 15 ICT. 
65 Council Regulation (EC) No 428/2009 of 5 May 2009 setting up a Community regime for the control of 
exports, transfer, brokering and transit of dual-use items [2009] L 134/1. 
66 The Dual-use Regulation requires controls on the transfer of certain items listed in Annex IV: Articles 2(11) 
and 22. See Commission, Green Paper, The dual-use export control system of the European Union: ensuring 
security and competitiveness in a changing world COM(2011)393final, at 18 and Commission Staff Working 
Document, Strategic export controls: ensuring security and competitiveness in a changing world – A report on 
the public consultation launched under the Green Paper COM(2011) 393final, at 19.  
67 Recitals 6 and 43 and Article 1 ICT. See Recital 3 ICT referring to the more general objectives of removing 
disparities which may distort competition and hamper innovation, industrial cooperation and competitiveness of 
the defence industry within the EU.  
68 Recital 6 ICT.  
69 Recital 7 ICT. 
70  Ibid and Article 1(2) ICT. See also Recital 30 ICT referring to Member State cooperation within the 
framework of Council Common Position 2008/944/CFSP of 8 December 2008 defining common rules 
governing control of exports of military technology and equipment [2008] OJ L 335.  
71 The number of references to exports in the Recitals are alone indicative. See Recitals 4, 7, 12, 27, 28, 29, 30, 
31, 33, 34, 35 and 36 ICT. As GRIP, supra note 5, observes at 60: “Member States have used the opportunity 
given by the Directive to impose specific restrictions in their general transfer licences in order to maintain the 
coherence of their arms export control policy.” 
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Member State discretion. It is suggested that any future revision of the ICT would need to 
identify more clearly its harmonisation objectives. 
 The ICT is also equivocal with regard to its scope of coverage concerning 
intergovernmental cooperation. As will be discussed in Section 4.3.1, the ICT requires 
Member States to impose mandatory publication of general licences in certain cases but 
Article 5(3) provides that Member States may publish a general licence for the purposes of 
participation in an “intergovernmental cooperation programme”. 72  However, as will be 
discussed in Section 4.3.3 Article 4(2)(c) provides that Member States may exempt from 
licencing transfers necessary for the implementation of a “cooperative armament programme 
between Member States”.73 Further, Article 4(3) also provides that a Member State or the 
Commission at their own initiative may seek to amend the ICT’s categories of transfer 
currently exempt from licencing to also exempt a transfer necessary for intergovernmental 
cooperation.74 Yet, Article 1(4) also provides that the ICT does not affect the possibility for 
Member States to pursue and further develop intergovernmental cooperation, whilst 
complying with the ICT’s provisions.75 Thus, the ICT simultaneously provides for optional 
subjection of intergovernmental cooperation programmes to general transfer licences, 
optional exemption of cooperative armament programmes from licencing and the future 
possibility of optional exemption of intergovernmental cooperation programmes from 
licencing with the continuing possibility to pursue and further develop intergovernmental 
cooperation outside the ICT. Therefore, on the one hand, it is possible that the LoI identified 
in Section 2.1 could continue to provide an independent framework for the development of 
more detailed licencing measures thereby potentially influencing the future development of 
the ICT regime.76 On the other hand, the co-existence of intergovernmental and supranational 
licencing regimes in a “two-speed” Europe may not be sustainable. The LoI acquis has 
already been largely transferred to the EU in light of the EU’s exercise of competences in the 
field of defence trade.77 Further, certain Member States may argue that licencing measures 
adopted outside the framework of the ICT to which they are not party may be discriminatory. 
Indeed, it is recalled from Section 2.1 that this was identified as a particular reason for 
introducing the ICT.78 Therefore, a revised ICT should clarify its scope of coverage with 
respect to intergovernmental cooperation. 
 Having considered the legal basis, nature and scope of harmonisation, the 
remaining sections of this article examine the level of harmonisation achieved by the ICT. 
 
 
3. General coverage of the ICT 
The ICT applies to defence-related products.79 These products are set out in an Annex which 
must correspond to the EU Common Military List (“CML”) 80 adopted in the context of 
72 “Intergovernmental cooperation programme” is not defined. 
73 Similarly, “Cooperative armament programme” is not defined. 
74 See Recital 16 ICT and Article 4(3)(c) ICT. 
75 Recital 8 and Article 1(4) ICT. “Intergovernmental cooperation” is not defined. 
76 The authors are grateful to Mr. Ian Bendelow for discussions on the potential continuing role of the LoI 
initiative in light of the ICT.  
77 The relevant Sub-Committee recognises the EU’s competence to regulate intra-Union transfers. 
78 Section 2.1, supra note 38. 
79 Articles 2 and 3(1) ICT.  
80 Common Military List of the European Union [2007] OJ L88/58. See also Recital 10 ICT. This list must not 
be confused with that of Council Decision of 1958 (Article 346(2) TFEU list), supra note 58, which determines 
the material scope of Article 346(1)(b) TFEU. 
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Council Common Position 2008/944/CFSP with regard to defence exports.81 Article 13(1) 
ICT requires the Commission to update the Annex in order to strictly correspond to the CML 
and which has, to date, already been amended three times. 82  It follows that the ICT’s 
coverage of products is determined by the Council. The ICT’s application to products 
corresponding to the CML is intended to address the criticism concerning the variable use of 
national lists discussed in Section 2.1. However, the ICT’s harmonisation-through-
simplification objective has already been compromised. The Annex should be identical to the 
CML at all times but, in practice, the Annex has not fully corresponded to the CML for most 
of the year because the procedure for amending the Annex has taken at least seven months 
followed by a further transposition period.83 The Commission therefore rightly considers it 
necessary to simplify the procedure for aligning the Annex and CML.84  
 
 
4. Transfers and licences 
The fundamental innovation intended by the ICT is to qualitatively differentiate transfers 
from exports. Firstly, what used to constitute “exports” from one Member State to another 
within the EU now constitute intra-Union “transfers”. Article 3(2) defines a ‘transfer’ as “any 
transmission or movement of a defence-related product from a supplier to a recipient in 
another Member State”. 85  It must be further qualified that whilst a transfer of defence 
products from one Member State to another must be subject to prior authorisation in the form 
of a licence, a further licence cannot be imposed for mere passage86 of those products through 
one or more other Member States or for entrance onto their territory unless justified on 
grounds of public security or public policy. 87  Secondly, the ICT aims to facilitate the 
progressive replacement of individual ex-ante control, exercised through narrowly defined 
licences, with more broadly defined licences compensated by ex-post controls, including 
conditions on export, which are designed to foster mutual trust.88 It is therefore important to 
acknowledge that the ICT does not create a European “licence-free zone”;, licences continue 
to be subject to at least some prior authorisation through ‘transfer licences’ which are to be 
distinguished from ‘export licences’. 89  Two principal reasons have been identified for 
81 The CML is updated by the Council annually usually as a consequence of an amendment to the ‘Munitions 
List’ adopted in the framework of the Wassenaar Arrangement. The latest version is The Wassenaar 
Arrangement on Export Controls for Conventional Arms and Dual-Use Goods and Technologies, List of Dual-
Use Goods and Technologies and Munitions List, WA-LIST (14) 2* 25 March 2015.  
82 Recitals 37 and 45 and Article 13(1) ICT. See Commission Directive 2010/80/EU [2010] OJ L308/11 ; 
Commission Directive 2012/10/EU [2012] OJ L85/3 ;  Commission Directive 2014/108/EU [2014] OJ 
L359/117. 
83 Transposition Report, supra note 5, at 13. 
84 ibid. See also GRIP, supra note 5, at 64. 
85 Article 3(3) ICT defines a ‘supplier’ as the legal or natural person established within the [EU] who is legally 
responsible for a transfer. Article 3(4) ICT defines a ‘recipient; as a legal or natural person established within 
the [EU] who is legally responsible for the receipt of a transfer. 
86 Recitals 9, 17 and Article 4(1) ICT. Article 3(7) ICT defines ‘passage through’ as “the transport of defence-
related products through one or more Member States other than the originating and receiving Member States.”  
87 Recital 14 ICT identifies the safety of storage, risk of diversion and prevention of crime as legitimate reasons. 
Germany, Hungary and the Netherlands have made use of these exceptions to maintain entrance and passage 
licences or prior notification systems with regard to certain categories of products. See Transposition Report, 
supra note 5, 18. According to the latest report on The impact of the ‘defence package’ Directives on European 
Defence, supra note 5, at 43 fn72, this can be seen as a limitation to the ICT’s application and which, in 
practical terms, means that companies will have to inquire as to the existence of such measures. 
88 Recital 29 ICT. 
89 Article 3(5) ICT defines a ‘transfer licence’ as: “an authorisation by a national authority of a Member State 
for suppliers to transfer defence-related products to a recipient in another Member State.” See also Recital 16 
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retaining a licencing regime. The first concerns the relative infancy of a common foreign 
policy and “uneven levels of trust” about the extent to which certain external borders 
maintain sufficient control.90 The second is that the removal of licencing altogether would 
render it difficult to enforce certain export controls that are otherwise required by existing 
international export control regimes.91 Ultimately, licencing was still considered necessary as 
a “vehicle” to carry possible re-export limitations.92  
 
4.1. Types of transfer licence 
Prior to the ICT, individual, general, and global licences were available. All three have been 
retained under the ICT and transposed into national laws.93 Member States remain free to 
determine the appropriate choice of licence and the types of products covered by it.94  
An individual transfer licence must be specifically requested by a supplier granting 
one specific authorisation for a single transfer of a specified quantity of specified products to 
be transmitted in one or several shipments to only one recipient.95 Prior to the ICT, individual 
licences were most commonly used.96 Notwithstanding their continued availability, as will be 
discussed in Section 4.2, the ICT intends to reduce recourse to individual licences.   
A general transfer licence is an authorisation granted to suppliers established in one 
Member State to perform transfers of specified defence-related products to categories of 
recipients located in another Member State. 97  The main distinguishing feature is that a 
Member State must publish a general licence in order that a supplier meeting its terms and 
conditions is directly authorised to transfer without having to specifically request to do so in 
each case.98 Removal of such requests enables a freer movement of specified goods and 
increased security of supply within a nascent Internal Market for defence goods.  
Between the extremes of a general licence and individual licence is the global transfer 
licence. A global transfer licence is a licence which must be specifically requested by a 
supplier granting a specific authorisation to transfer products to authorised recipients in one 
or more other Member States.99 The significant point of departure for the ICT is an attempt to 
change the type of licence predominantly used in practice away from restrictive individual 
licences towards broader general licences and to exempt certain types of transfer from 
licensing requirements altogether.  
 
4.2. Individual transfer licences 
As indicated in Section 4.1 above, prior to the ICT, individual transfer licences were most 
common and which contributed significantly to the costs and barriers to trade discussed in 
Section 2.1. 100   Notwithstanding their continued availability, the ICT intends to reduce 
recourse to individual licences to four exhaustively defined circumstances discussed 
ICT. Article 3(6) ICT defines an ‘export licence’ as: “an authorisation to supply defence-related products to a 
legal or natural person in any third country.” 
90 Impact Assessment, supra note 4, at 24. 
91 Ibid. identifying Wassenaar and the Missile Technology Control Regime, also acknowledged in Recitals 7 and 
28 ICT. 
92 Impact Assessment, supra note 4, at 24-25.  
93 Ibid., at 4. See also Article 4(4) ICT and Transposition Report, supra note 5, at 8.  
94 Article 4(5) and Recital 18 ICT. 
95 Article 7 ICT.  
96 Impact Assessment, supra note 4, at 36. 
97 Article 5(1) ICT. 
98 Article 5(1) and Recital 21 ICT.  
99 Article 6(1) ICT.  
100 Impact Assessment, supra note 4, at 36. 
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below. 101 However, beyond prescribing these circumstances, the ICT contains no further 
provisions regarding the permitted terms and conditions and their period of validity. 102 
Limited information has also been provided with regard to Member State use of individual 
licences under the ICT in terms of the types of products covered, for example.103 
 Concerning the circumstances in which individual licences may continue to be used, 
the first of these is where the request is limited to one transfer. This is unlikely to be 
particularly problematic from an Internal Market perspective, given that the licence is not 
imposed by the licencing authority in order to limit the user’s ability to transfer but rather a 
single transfer is expressly requested by the user. 
 The second circumstance is where it is necessary for compliance with international 
obligations and commitments. This reflects the ICT’s general approach to ensuring 
compliance with other international obligations and commitments. 104  Reliance on this 
circumstance is nevertheless likely to be subject to implied limitations to ensure that those 
international agreements or arrangements genuinely require an individual licence and are not 
used to circumvent the ICT’s objectives.   
 The third circumstance is where it is necessary for the protection of essential security 
interests or on grounds of public policy.105 As indicated in Section 2.2.2 above, this may be 
an attempt to accommodate such interests inside the regime rather than through an exception 
under Article 36 TFEU or derogation under Article 346 TFEU. 
 The final circumstance is where a Member State has “serious reason” to believe that 
the supplier will not be able to comply with all the terms and conditions necessary to grant it 
a global transfer licence (see 4.4 below). This circumstance is problematic for a number of 
reasons. Firstly, whilst this reinforces the ICT’s attempt to institute a hierarchy or preference 
of licences (i.e. general or global in preference to individual), Member States exercise 
discretion to determine the terms and conditions (and products) for each type of licence. It is 
therefore difficult to know which terms and conditions are more or less susceptible to non-
compliance. This is symptomatic of the fact that the ICT does not provide clear guidance to 
Member States in differentiating when a particular type of licence should be used as well as 
the terms and conditions applicable to each type. Secondly, it is not clear what will constitute 
a “serious reason” or the threshold and evidence in support of the belief required. It is argued 
that a revised ICT should retain a circumstance in which an authority grants an individual 
licence on its own initiative (as opposed to at the supplier’s request) and for reasons other 
than to protect essential security as some default authorisation is necessary. 106 This may, for 
example, concern the circumstance indicated, namely where there is a risk that a supplier 
cannot comply with an alternate form of licence but also individual licences may exercise 
certain legitimate functions, for example, where a transfer involves highly sensitive products. 
However, in making such provision, clarity is required as to the kinds of reasons that might 
justify use of an individual licence as well as the burden of proof in order to safeguard against 
101 The conditions for use of an individual licence derive exhaustively from the circumstances permitting their 
use. This does mean, however, that the ICT does not appear to place any limitations on the duration of validity 
of an individual licence.  
102 UNISYS, supra note 4, at 14 highlights that prior to the ICT, individual licences were typically subject to 
limited duration, for example, expiring after 12 months or on fulfilment of a specified quantity.  In the UK, 
individual licences under the ICT are considered equivalent to Standard Individual Export Licence (SIELs) and 
which are valid for two years. See the Department for Business Innovation & Skills, Notice to Exporters 
2012/37 Implementation of the European Union Directive 2009/43/EC (Intra-Community Transfer of Defence 
Goods or ‘ICT Directive’), at 3. 
103 Transposition Report, supra note 5, at 10.  
104 Recital 7 ICT. 
105 See also Recital 14 ICT. 
106 The authors are grateful to Baudouin Heuninckx for discussions on this issue.  
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the risk of abuse. The key will be to ensure that the continued availability of individual 
licences does not prejudice a successful transition to general licences.  
 
4.3. General transfer licences 
Member States are free to determine the appropriate choice of licence.107 However, the ICT 
signals a clear emphasis on general transfer licences as the least restrictive form.108 Prior to 
the ICT, Member States, with the exception of the UK, did not provide for extensive use of 
general licences.109 The Commission had even considered a regime exclusively comprising 
general licences.110 Whilst this could have minimised bureaucracy and significantly improved 
security of supply, the Commission considered an EU-wide general licencing regime to be 
unacceptable to the Member States not least because the general licence is not suitable for all 
types of equipment, especially the most sensitive.111 
 
4.3.1. Circumstances requiring general licences 
The ICT provides a list of “at least” four circumstances in which publication of a general 
licence is mandatory.112 Therefore, Member States may exceed the minimum by requiring 
general licences in additional circumstances not listed.113   
 Perhaps the most significant circumstance requiring a general licence is where the 
recipient is certified in accordance with the ICT’s certification provisions. The combined 
ability of a supplier to rely on a general licence compensated by certification of the recipient 
is a key component of the ICT and which is reserved for discussion in Section 6.114  
 A second circumstance is where the recipient is part of a Member State’s armed 
forces or a defence contracting authority, purchasing for the exclusive use by that Member 
State’s armed forces. This circumstance is intended to have a specific impact on defence 
procurement. For instance, Article 23(a) Defence and Security Procurement Directive 
2009/81/EC provides that, in order to ensure security of supply, a contracting authority can 
require a tenderer to demonstrate that it will be able to honour its obligations regarding the 
export, transfer and transit of goods associated with the contract. It is usually the case that at 
the time of tender preparation, the authorisation to transfer equipment will not yet have been 
granted. Therefore, in some cases, contracting authorities may consider that a foreign supplier 
poses a greater risk with regard to guaranteeing securing of supply of the equipment than a 
domestic supplier given the difficulty of having to obtain a licence. The Commission’s 
Guidance Note on Security of Supply, published to assist transposition of Directive 
2009/81/EC, suggests that this uncertainty is now removed given that a general licence will 
107 Article 4(5) ICT. 
108 GRIP, supra note 5, at 42: “the licence of reference.” 
109 Impact Assessment, supra note 4, at 15, 34. The UK has widely implemented a general licence for military 
goods under Open General Export Licences (OGELs). See Masson et al, The “Transfer Directive”, supra note 
3, at 15-19 on British practice and 19 on German practice. According to one respondent interviewed for this 
article, Mr. Ian Bendelow, this has enabled an effective transposition of the ICT in the UK with relatively few 
adjustments to UK licencing practice. See also Notice to Exporters 2012/37 supra note 103 referring at 2 to the 
ICT model being “UK inspired”. 
110 Impact Assessment, supra note 4, at 34-35. 
111 Impact Assessment, supra note 4, at 35. 
112 Article 5(2)(a)-(d) ICT. 
113  On minimum harmonization under EU law generally, see Weatherill, “Beyond preemption? Shared 
competence and constitutional change in the European Community” in O’Keefe and Twomey (eds) Legal Issues 
of the Maastricht Treaty (Chancery Law Publishing, 1994) and Dougan, ‘Minimum Harmonization and the 
Internal Market’ (2000) 37 CML Rev. 853, 854-856.  
114 Article 9 ICT concerns the certification of recipients of defence-related products. See also Recital 23 ICT. 
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have already been published with the necessary authorisation. 115  Recital 22 ICT also 
indicates that this will “greatly increase” security of supply to armed forces. However, as will 
be discussed in Section 5 below, general licences can still be withdrawn or granted with end-
use restrictions and much still depends on the type of products covered, all of which may 
continue to hinder security of supply.116 More fundamentally, it may be questioned to what 
extent security of supply can be guaranteed whatever licence is used not least because such 
guarantees only represent the tenderer’s position at the time of tender.117 Rather, the best 
assurance of optimal security of supply is to eliminate any licensing requirement altogether 
but which is currently only possible if a Member State decides to exempt armed forces 
transfers from prior authorisation. As will be indicated in Section 4.3.3 below, there is an 
argument for presumptively exempting armed forces transfers from prior authorisation. 
 The third and fourth circumstances are where the transfer is made for the purposes of 
demonstration, evaluation or exhibition or for the purposes of maintenance and repair.118 
Again, as will be indicated in Section 4.3.3, such transfers could be the subject of 
presumptive exemption from a licencing requirement altogether.  
 In addition, the ICT also provides that Member States participating in an 
intergovernmental cooperation programme may publish a general licence for transfers 
necessary for the programme’s execution.119 It appears that few large armaments producing 
Member States have directly transposed this option.120 As explained in Section 4.3.3 below, 
such transfers could be the subject of presumptive exemption from a licensing requirement 
altogether although this matter is complicated by general uncertainty regarding the extent to 
which intergovernmental cooperation should be subject to or excluded from the ICT, an issue 
identified in Section 2.2.2 above. 
 Overall, the potential variability of national transposition and practices resulting from 
minimum harmonization are already apparent. It has been reported that some Member States 
have only provided for mandatory general licences in two out of four circumstances. 121 
Further, some Member States have exceeded the minimum and subjected transfers to 
mandatory general licences in other circumstances, for example, transfers to the police, 
customs, border guards, and coast guards.122 The ICT seems to suggest that further general 
licences could be published where the risks to security are low in view of the nature of the 
115  DG Internal Market and Services, Guidance Note, Security of Supply, at 10. There is no comparable 
Guidance Note for the implementation of the ICT although it must be acknowledged that the issuance of such 
guidance is rare. 
116 This view has also been expressed by the UK in its guidance published to assist interpretation of the UK 
Regulations implementing Directive 2009/81/EC. See The Defence and Security Public Contract Regulations 
2011, Chapter 12 – Security of Supply, 7, para. 38.  
117 Heuninckx, ‘Trick or Treat?’ supra note 2, 24. 
118 In the case of maintenance and repair, the recipient must be the originating supplier of the defence-related 
products. Article 5(2)(d) ICT. 
119 Recital 24 and Article 5(3) ICT.  
120 According to the Transposition Report, supra note 5, at 9, Spain envisages general licences for transfers 
related to operations of NATO and NAMSA; Bulgaria, Greece, Cyprus, and Malta envisage general licences for 
cooperation programmes, provided for in Article 5(3). See also The impact of the ‘defence package’ Directives 
on European Defence, supra note 5, 46, fn 82. Importantly, this means that large armaments-producing states 
such as France, Germany, Sweden and the UK have not transposed this option. The authors are grateful to 
Baudouin Heuninckx for this observation. However, it is possible that because this is not a mandatory provision, 
Member States have not felt the need to transpose it. Thus, the absence of formal transposition of this provision 
should not necessarily be taken as an indication that this option is not available. 
121 See The impact of the ‘defence package’ Directives on European Defence, ibid., at 45-46.  
122 See France: Arrêté du 6 janvier 2012 relatif à la licence générale de transfert dans l'Union européenne de 
produits liés à la défense à destination de la police, des douanes, des gardes-frontières et des gardes-côtes d'un 
Etat membre dans un but exclusif d'utilisation par ces destinataires, JORF n°0008 of 10/01/2012, at 419. For 
other types of general licence identified as used in a range of Member States, see GRIP, supra note 4, at 19-22. 
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product and recipients.123 However, as will be suggested in Section 4.3.3, the ICT’s focus 
should be on subjecting the highest risk transfers to licencing whilst exempting low risk 
transfers from licencing altogether to the extent possible, rather than establishing minimum 
licencing requirements whatever the risk. 
 
4.3.2. Coverage of general licences 
It is recalled from Section 3 that Member States determine not only the choice of licence but 
also the types of products listed in the Annex corresponding to the CML that will be covered 
by the licence. 124 Several issues have arisen in this regard. Firstly, practice already indicates 
that, whilst all Member States refer to the CML, Member States are also continuing to use 
national ammunition lists or other international control lists when determining the coverage 
of chosen licences.125 This variability is exacerbated by the fact that, as indicated, the Annex 
does not always correspond to the CML.126 Secondly, it is questionable to what extent the 
ICT provides an effective balance between Member States’ freedom to limit the types of 
products that can be subject to a general licence and ensuring that general licences can be 
used for as broad a range of products as possible. On the one hand, Member States appear to 
define the scope of their general licences case-by-case and based on factors such as the 
recipient in question, the sensitivity of the product, risk assessment and diversion risk on 
export.127 This is a perfectly legitimate exercise, in particular allowing licencing authorities to 
tailor a licence to a particular security scenario. 128 On the other hand, post-transposition 
practice suggests that there is a lack of consensus as to how to define or classify 
“sensitive”129 products that should be excluded from the scope of a general licence.130 Given 
the need to encourage the uptake of general licences, it is understandable that the ICT 
provides maximum flexibility to select from the full range of listed products in defining 
general licences. Further, it may be argued that at least the ICT is requiring Member States to 
make assessments about the sensitivity of products in the context of using general licences 
rather than as a basis to simply legitimate default recourse to individual licences. An open 
question concerns whether challenges could be made to Member State licencing decisions 
regarding the choice of products covered, in particular, in light of proportionality concerns. It 
is suggested that a revised ICT could include more explicit provisions requiring that any 
limitations on the categories of products capable of being transferred under a general licence 
are based on a genuine and proportionate control need.131 Whilst Member States might argue 
that this impinges on the exercise of Member States’ transfer policies, it has been observed 
that Member States practice at present “varies greatly […] and patterns are difficult to 
establish”.132 Lack of “visibility and clarity” of different national lists,133 has ultimately made 
123 Recital 25 ICT. 
124 Recital 18 and Article 4(5) ICT. Concerning general licences specifically, see Article 5(1) ICT. 
125 GRIP supra note 5, 23-27, 28-9, 38-9. 
126 Ibid at 25, Luxembourg appeared to be the only country referring to the most recent version of the ICT 
Annex in the definition of defence goods covered by its general transfer licences. 
127 GRIP, supra note 5, at 23.  
128 The authors are grateful to Baudouin Heuninckx for this observation. 
129 This must be contrasted with Article 4(8) ICT which indicates that the sensitivity of a transfer of components 
is relevant to determining the application of any export limitations for components. See Article 4(8) ICT. 
130 GRIP supra note 5, at 38. 
131 Article 4(7) ICT already requires Member States to assess the sensitivity of the transfer when determining the 
terms and conditions of transfer licences for components, taking into account the nature and significance of the 
components. 
132 GRIP, supra note 5, at 27. 
133 GRIP, ibid., at 27. According to the Transposition Report, supra note 5, at 9 only six Member States had 
communicated their respective lists to the Commission. 
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use of general licences less attractive for companies. 134 Therefore, at least some attempt 
should be made to ensure that general licences are not being restrictively defined. A balanced 
assessment indicates that, over time, use of the ICT may, at the very least, reveal that there 
are certain core categories of listed products for which general licences are clearly more 
suitable. This may also reveal that it may well be proportionate to exclude certain categories 
from being subject to a general licence.135  
 It has been suggested that the ICT should ideally include a harmonised list of covered 
products using the CML as an already widely used reference point with clearer 
correspondence to certain international control lists.136 Ideally, a harmonised list would be 
comprehensive based on a common understanding of “sensitive products” to be definitively 
included or excluded from the list. However, it appears impossible at this stage to recommend 
a detailed list of categories of sensitive products to be excluded that would be accepted by all 
Member States.137 It has therefore been recommended that a positive or minimum list should 
be adopted.138 Determining “sensitivity” of products based on product coverage rather than 
Member State discretion may reduce subjectivity. Several Member States and companies 
have called for such a list “while taking into account national limitations” which would 
presumably need to be clearly defined.139 However, due to the national security context some 
flexibility needs to be retained to encourage the use of general licences in practice.  
 
4.3.3. Exemptions  
It is recalled from Section 4.3.1 that the ICT identifies four circumstances in which general 
licences are required and one where a general licence is permitted. However, the ICT also 
identifies five circumstances in which Member States may optionally exempt transfers from 
prior authorisation altogether. 140 As will be discussed, it is suggested that the similarity 
between certain circumstances requiring or permitting general licences and certain of those 
permitting exemption from licencing altogether indicate uncertainty as to the level at which 
to set the floor of harmonisation. On the one hand it could be argued that the exemptions 
merely offer Member States the option of going beyond harmonisation to achieve total 
licence-free liberalisation. On the other hand, it also raises legitimate questions as to whether 
certain circumstances requiring or permitting use of general licences should be subject to 
prior authorisation through a licence as a general rule. 
 The two circumstances providing optional exemption from prior authorisation and 
which appear to be the least controversial in achieving total liberalisation are where the EU, 
NATO, the International Atomic Energy Agency or other intergovernmental organisations 
send supplies in the performance of their tasks141 and “the transfer is linked to humanitarian 
aid in the case of disaster or as a donation in an emergency.”142 As indicated in Section 4.3.1, 
there are no similar circumstances otherwise requiring mandatory use of a general licence. 
Concerning the first circumstance, whilst supplier or recipient status as an international body 
does not automatically eliminate security and export diversion risks, such risks are likely to 
be limited in transfers between allies as opposed to instances in which a recipient is a private 
134 GRIP, supra note 5, at 39.  
135  An obvious example might be category ML17g nuclear power generating equipment. The authors are 
grateful to Baudouin Heuninckx for this observation. 
136 GRIP, supra note 4, at 63 emphasises the design of the list based specifically on the Wassenaar List. 
137 Ibid., at 39. 
138 GRIP, supra note 4, at 63.  
139  Ibid., at 48 and 63. 
140 Article 4(3) ICT further provides for the Commission on its own initiative or at a Member State’s request to 
amend the ICT to exempt three additional circumstances from prior authorisation. 
141 Article 4(2)(b) ICT. 
142 Article 4(2)(d) ICT. 
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economic operator. Not all Member States have transposed this type of exemption. 143 
Concerning the second circumstance, in addition to enabling expeditious transfer, references 
to disasters and donations suggest that the material in question will not raise major security 
concerns. This exemption is also consistent with the EU’s humanitarian obligations.144 
 More problematic are two circumstances permitting optional exemption from prior 
authorisation which, broadly construed, cover the same circumstances in which Member 
States must otherwise subject to mandatory general licencing. The first is where the supplier 
or recipient is a governmental body or part of the armed forces.145 This is similar to the 
mandatory ground for use of a general licence discussed in Section 4.3.1 above. 146 The 
second is where the transfer is necessary for or after repair, maintenance, exhibition or 
demonstration.147 Again, this is similar to the mandatory ground for use of a general licence 
discussed in Section 4.3.1.148 Concerning the government body and armed forces exemption, 
a similar rationale applies to that of exemption of transfers by international organisations. 
Again, not all Member States have transposed or made use of this type of exemption.149 
Concerning the demonstration to repair exemption, this exemption reflects the general reality 
that products at the pre-production or post-production  stage carry a lower level of risk. A 
number of Member States have made use of this exemption.150 
 In addition to the listed exemptions, the Commission (or Member State on request) 
may amend the list of exemptions from prior authorisation to also include cases where inter 
alia it is necessary for “intergovernmental cooperation”. 151  Conversely, as indicated in 
Section 4.3.1 above, in addition to the list of circumstances requiring mandatory publication 
of a general licence, the ICT also provides that Member States participating in an 
intergovernmental cooperation programme concerning the development, production and use 
of one or more-defence related products may publish a general transfer licence under the 
programme.152 This “half-way” position between exemption from licencing and mandatory 
general licencing reflects both the importance and flexibility attributed to the objectives of 
cooperative procurement programmes under the Defence Package as a whole. The Defence 
and Security Procurement Directive 2009/81/EC similarly contains a specific provision 
permitting the exclusion of cooperative programmes based on research and development 
from its contract award procedures to ensure flexibility when procuring under, and executing, 
such programmes. 153  An exemption from licencing requirements for transfers is broadly 
consistent with this flexibility objective, although, as indicated in Sections 2.2.2 and 4.3.1 
143 Transposition Report, supra note 5, at 6.  
144 Articles 208-211 TFEU. 
145 Article 4(2)(a) ICT. 
146 Article 5(2)(a) ICT 
147 Article 4(2)(e) ICT. 
148 Article 5(2)(c) and (d) ICT. 
149 Transposition Report, supra note 5, at 6. 
150 Bulgaria, Estonia, Greece, France, Malta, Austria, Slovenia, Slovakia and Sweden. See Transposition Report, 
supra note 4, at 7. 
151 Article 4(3)(c) ICT, in turn, referring to Art.1(4) but which does not define “pursue and further develop 
intergovernmental cooperation”. 
152 Article5(3) ICT. An example includes the Eurofigher/Typhoon fighter aircraft programme. For a discussion 
of EU armaments collaboration, see Heuninckx, “A Primer to Collaborative Procurement in Europe: Troubles, 
Achievements and Prospects” (2008) 17 PPL Rev 123-145 and The Law of Collaborative Defence Procurement 
Through International Organisations in the European Union, Ph.D. thesis submitted to the University of 
Nottingham and the Belgian Royal Military Academy, July 2011 (on file); and The Law of Collaborative 
Defence Procurement in the European Union (CUP, 2016), Chapter 8. 
153 See Article 13(c) Directive 2009/81/EC. For a discussion of this provision, see Trybus, Buying Defence and 
Security in Europe, supra note 2, at 283-288. 
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above, the extent to which intergovernmental cooperation should be subject to or excluded 
from the ICT requires clarification under a revised ICT. 
 The correspondence between certain circumstances permitting optional exemption 
and those requiring mandatory general licencing begs the question as to whether a revised 
ICT could be recalibrated. Firstly, the two circumstances providing optional exemption from 
prior authorisation which are not also covered by general licences i.e. international 
organisation and humanitarian transfers could be categorically excluded .154 Secondly, the 
armed forces and demonstration to repair circumstances which are subject to general licences 
but which also correspond to circumstances permitting optional exemption could be 
presumptively excluded from prior authorisation altogether. This would presumptively mean 
total licence free liberalisation perhaps subject only to possible prior authorisation if a public 
policy or public security reason can be established.155 This would send a clearer signal that 
such “low-risk” transfers should operate in a uniform licence free zone unless it can be 
established that prior authorisation is necessary in exceptional cases. As indicated in Section 
2.2., given that any form of licencing requirement is generally considered to be a restriction 
on the Internal Market, the fewer circumstances subject to licencing the better.156  At present, 
the current portfolio of optional exemptions offers flexibility but also indicates a certain 
ambivalence as to the baseline at which to set the baseline of harmonisation.157  
 
4.4. Global transfer licences 
As indicated in Section 4.1, the global transfer licence is situated between the extremes of a 
general licence and individual licence. 158  According to the Commission, the main 
simplification potential of the global licence is that it is not specific to a precise shipment 
and, thus, can be used several times to cover similar transfers.159 Further, global transfer 
licences are typically not subject to quantitative limits and are valid over a long period.160 
Historically, global licences have been considered particularly helpful in cases of routine 
shipments to habitual customers or for SMEs with a limited catalogue.161 Their potential had 
already been realised in certain Member States before the ICT.162  
 However, it is observed that the intended effect of global licences is uncertain and 
which is difficult to discern in light of no or limited information that has been communicated 
regarding transposition of general licences under the ICT.163 Firstly, the underlying rationale 
for global licences is now unclear. The Commission opted against a ‘global licences only’ 
approach because a combination of general and global licences would enable general licences 
154 This would not necessarily preclude the possibility for Member States to justify a licencing requirement 
based on Article 36 or 346 TFEU.  
155 Concerning cooperative programmes, there may be a case for the use of a licence if the programme concerns 
sensitive R&D.  
156 Perhaps even more radically, it may be questioned whether it would be possible to introduce requirements 
short of licencing to ensure that such transfers are subject to at least some form of monitoring provided such 
monitoring does not, itself, infringe EU law.  
157 Article 5(2) enumerating the circumstances requiring mandatory general licences simply indicates that it is 
“without prejudice to Article 4(2)” enumerating the list of optional exemptions from prior authorisation. 
158 Article 6(1) ICT.  
159 Impact Assessment, supra note 5, at 36. 
160 Ibid., at 35. 
161 Impact Assessment, supra note 5, at 35. See also GRIP, supra note 5, at 39. 
162 GRIP, ibid. In 2002, France introduced global licences based on a catalogue of participating companies, 
specifically targeting SMEs. See Impact Assessment, supra note 4, at 36. The first 35 licences replaced 1,250 
individual licences, a reduction in administrative bureaucracy by a ratio of 36. Similarly, during the ICT's 
preparatory phase, Romania indicated that it had replaced 700 individual licences with 7 global licences: ibid. 
163 Transposition Report supra note 5, 10. In the UK, these are the equivalent of Open Individual Export 
Licence (OIELs). See generally, See Notice to Exporters 2012/37 supra note 103, at 3. 
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for routine non-sensitive transfers while also accommodating the necessary flexibility for 
more sensitive transfers through global licences.164 Therefore, whilst global licences were 
formerly used to cover routine shipments of less sensitive products in great quantity over a 
long period, it now appears that global licences should be used to cover less routine 
shipments of more sensitive products over a maximum period of three years.165 Secondly, in 
contrast to general and individual licences, the ICT does not prescribe circumstances for use 
of global licences.166 Thirdly, Member States must determine the products or categories of 
products covered and the authorised recipients, again, indicating considerable discretion in 
the use of such licences.167 It is argued that this does not make the global licence the intended 
“default” type of licence under the ICT. It is suggested that if this had been the EU 
legislator’s intention, more detailed provision on global licences would have been included. 
The inclusion of global licences may reflect the view that they are intended merely as a 
transitional measure until general licences are fully operational.168 
 The Commission had acknowledged a small risk that Member States may define 
global licences in such restrictive terms as to be equivalent to individual licences, but states 
that there is little reason to fear such abuses as a Member State would compromise the 
competitive position of its industries. 169 However, this does presuppose that competition 
rather than national security or some other protectionist motive will be the primary 
determinant when making licencing decisions. Nevertheless, global licences could be relied 
on, in particular, by small businesses used to such licences in order to avoid the perceived 
administrative and resource burdens of the certification regime under general licences 
discussed in Section 6 below.170 
 If global licences are transitional, it is suggested that the ICT should provide an 
illustrative list of circumstances in which a global licence must or can be used with even 
greater clarity required if it is clarified that global licences are an important default licence 
under the ICT. Either way, current provision on global licences looks somewhat anomalous 
when compared to the more detailed provisions on general and individual licences. 
 
4.5. The details: licence form, registration, terms, conditions and supplier information 
The ICT neither prescribes any particular documentary form for general licences nor their 
publication in specific locations. According to recent reports on implementation of the ICT, 
general licences are often difficult to access, available in various documentary formats 
varying in length, published in languages other than English, and not generally available 
through the official websites of the relevant national authorities.171 Public visibility is integral 
to the credibility of the ICT regime among its users. A revised ICT could introduce further 
harmonisation to address some of these issues, for example, by specifying a common 
164 Impact Assessment, supra note 4, at 36. 
165 Article 6(2). Admittedly, Article 6(2) ICT provides that this period may be renewed although does not 
identify a minimum or maximum length of renewal. The UK’s latest guidance suggests that the limitation of 
global licences to only three years constitutes a “significant difference” to previous UK practice. See Notice to 
Exporters 2012/37 supra note 103, at 3. 
166 Rather, Recital 26 ICT simply states that “[w]here a general transfer licence cannot be published, Member 
states should, upon request, grant a global transfer licence […] except in the case set out in this Directive […]”. 
167  Article 6(2) ICT. 
168 GRIP, supra note 5, at 39. 
169 Ibid. 
170 The impact of the ‘defence package’ Directives on European Defence, supra note 5, at 49 and fn95. 
171 GRIP, supra note 5, at 19 and 20. 
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language and format or template. A more complex issue would be the centralisation of 
electronic access to general licence information.172 
 Even if suppliers can overcome difficulties experienced regarding documentation, 
before granting a general licence, the ICT provides that a Member State may lay down 
conditions for registration prior to first use.173 Therefore, Member States retain considerable 
discretion to define procedures for registration and de-registration, the latter not mentioned at 
all in the ICT. Again, a revised ICT could introduce further harmonisation regarding the 
requirement of registration and de-registration in order to ensure greater conformity of 
approach across the Member States. 
 In addition, whilst certain terms and conditions may protect legitimate public policy 
or security concerns, it is recalled from Section 2.1 that Member States continue to exercise 
discretion to determine all terms and conditions.174 Post-transposition practice indicates that 
Member States continue to rely on a diversity of terms and conditions most, if not all, of 
which appear to be disproportionate.175 Therefore, many of the criticisms predating the ICT 
regime continue to predominate under the current regime. This is a highly sensitive issue 
which Member States may perceive to be a matter falling within the discretion of national 
transfer policies. Notwithstanding, a revised ICT could seek to place certain explicit controls 
on licencing conditions, for example, to ensure that such terms and conditions are reasonable 
and proportionate to the transfer in question. Conversely, there has been some minimum 
harmonisation of information required of suppliers. The ICT provides that Member States 
must require suppliers to provide a range of information regarding the transfer.176 However, 
beyond this minimum, Member States can also determine additional information that may be 
required, again, creating potential divergences in requirements imposed.177   
 
 
5. End-use controls 
As indicated in Section 2.2.2, concerns regarding the illicit export of transferred goods into 
rogue hands or conflict zones in third countries remain a prevalent issue that has conditioned 
the ICT’s approach to transfers and provided the greatest scope for Member State discretion. 
Whilst ex ante controls are no longer possible through routine recourse to individual licences, 
even general licences retain the possibility for ex post controls ensuring that any export 
restriction on the defence good issued by the Member State of origin “follows the transferred 
good”.178 As this Section will demonstrate, it is with regard to export controls on transferred 
goods that the limitations of the ICT’s harmonisation objectives are most apparent. 
 
 
172 GRIP, ibid., suggests a potential designated module for general licences on the CERTIDER website given 
that this is a central information point for certification, on which see Section 6 below. 
173 In the UK, for example, most OGELs require the exporter or trader to register before making use of licences.  
174 Article 4(6) ICT. 
175 For instance, GRIP identifies French practice in which general licences have incorporated technical clauses 
requiring either the supplier or recipient to make specific alterations to the product before shipping it as well as 
specific conditions attached to each category of product. See supra note 5, at 36-37. 
176 Member States must ensure: that suppliers inform recipients of the terms and conditions of the transfer 
licence (including limitations relating to end-use) (Article 8(1) ICT); that suppliers inform, within a reasonable 
time, the competent authorities of the originating Member State of their intention to use a general licence for the 
first time (Article 8(2)); and regularly check that suppliers keep detailed records of their transfers and determine 
the reporting requirements attached to the use of a licence (whether general, global or individual) (Article 8(2)).  
177 Article 8(2) ICT. France has even reserved the right to conduct a preliminary interview with the supplier 
prior to transfer. See The impact of the ‘defence package’ Directives on European Defence, supra note 5, at 47 
fn. 88. 
178 Impact Assessment, supra note 4, at 41. 
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5.1. Limitations prior to transfer  
The ICT provides that Member States may not only include any limitations on export to third 
countries in their transfer licences but may also “avail themselves” i.e. positively take 
advantage of the possibility to request end-use assurances including end use certificates.179  
 As indicated in Section 2.2., the ICT does not intend to impact on Member States’ 
export control policies. Member State export measures are, to some extent, guided by the EU 
Council Common Position 2008/944/CFSP defining common rules governing military 
exports including a User Guide indicating best practice on the use of end-user certificates 
(“EUCs”). However, it has been observed that end-use obligations and the type or format of 
end-use documentation currently vary greatly among Member States. 180  It appears that 
Member States continue to require EUCs for individual and global licences.181 By contrast, 
Member States do not seem to require EUCs for transfers under a general licence but do 
generally include certain end-use restrictions such as non-re-export clauses, notification 
requirements and clauses requiring components to be integrated but which, again, vary.182 
Member States also impose a range of post-shipment controls in the form of delivery 
verification certificates (“DVCs”) and end-use monitoring which also vary.183 
 Ultimately, most Member States wish to maintain end-use controls for both third 
country exports and intra-Union transfers.184 A significant reason is that Member States have 
pre-existing commitments under international control regimes concerning controls on end-
use. Further, there is still a concern that export policies “vary quite widely” among Member 
States and which might constitute a risk where an importing Member State is an intermediary 
for export of transferred goods to a third country.185  
 In light of the above, it is arguable that the ICT fails to sufficiently distinguish 
between intra-Union transfers which do not involve exports to third countries and those 
which do involve exports to third countries. For instance, Article 4(8) provides that Member 
States must not impose any export limitations for components where the recipient provides a 
declaration of use that the components are, or are to be, integrated into its own products and 
cannot at a later stage be transferred or exported as such (unless for the purposes of 
maintenance or repair). 186 However, Member States may impose export limitations if the 
transfer of components is determined to be “sensitive”. 187  As indicated in Section 4.3.2 
above, distinguishing between sensitive and non-sensitive transfers may prove difficult for 
the purposes of determining which licence a product should be subject to let alone whether or 
not a transfer should be subject to export limitations.188  The continuing possibility for end-
179 Article 4(6) ICT. This language is arcane and should be clarified in a subsequent revision of the ICT. 
180 GRIP, supra note 5, at 54-56. 
181 Ibid., at 55 and 60. 
182 GRIP, supra note 5, at 56-57 observes that a non-re-export clause is always included. Some clauses prohibit 
re-export without prior written authorisation by the original exporting country. Some also permit re-export 
without prior authorisation to certain allied countries e.g. Australia, Canada, Japan, New Zealand, Norway, 
Switzerland and the United States.  
183 Ibid., at 58-59. Several Member States do not require DVCs for transfers within the EU and, where required, 
these are only used under individual licences. Ibid., at 58. 
184 GRIP, supra note 5 59. 
185 Ibid. 
186 See also Recital 19 ICT. Member State practice indicates that general licences may incorporate integration 
clauses or declarations, or statements certifying to this effect and that certain Member States have used these 
sorts of statements as an alternative to the use of a non-re-export clause: GRIP, supra note 5, at 36, citing 
Walloon Region, Flemish Region and Luxembourg. 
187 Article 4(7) ICT.  
188 Whilst as indicated in Section 4.3.2., the ICT does not include any guidance regarding the sensitivity of 
products, Article 4(7) identifies two criteria for determining sensitivity: (a) the nature of the components in 
relation to the products in which they are to be incorporated and any end-use of the finished products which 
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use controls to be applied to the transfer of components suggests that the continuing 
likelihood of end-use controls being applied to more substantial product categories is even 
greater. This raises further questions about the extent to which “sensitivity” is an effective 
criterion for application in this context.  
 Some Member States have indicated that controls on intra-Union transfers could be 
less restrictive than controls on exports.189 There appears to be continued support for global 
and individual licence transfers to retain EUC requirements. 190  However, it has been 
indicated that a majority of Member States are in favour of the harmonisation of EUCs, 
which could, in theory, also apply to general licence transfers but Member States do not have 
a common vision on its form and continue to express concern regarding the need for a case-
by-case assessment in light of the diversity of end-use(r).191 An open question is whether in 
cases in which an end-user is a certified company receiving products under a general licence 
without prospect of export, an end-use guarantee should not be required and may be 
considered disproportionate. In this regard, it could be argued that certification of the 
recipient itself should generally be treated as equivalent to a guarantee on end-use of the 
product within the EU and any end-use guarantee may be disproportionate.192 However, this 
equivalence may be questioned on the basis that, as will be discussed in Section 6, 
certification simply provides a determination in general terms that a company is reliable, in 
particular, has capacity to observe export limitations on products transferred under a general 
licence.193 Certification is not a legal guarantee that specified goods will not be exported. 
Therefore, it remains unclear whether further revision to the certification regime could more 
clearly differentiate between intra-EU transfers which do not involve exports and intra-EU 
transfers which do involve exports to third countries. This would appear unlikely under the 
next revision of the ICT given that, as discussed in Section 6, the certification regime itself 
has not been fully engaged by the user communities. 
 
5.2. Limitations prior to export 
Corresponding to the limitations placed on transfers through the imposition of terms and 
conditions and end use obligations regarding export, the ICT also seeks to ensure that the 
recipient of transferred products complies with export limitations when applying for an 
export licence. Article 10 ICT requires recipients to declare to their competent authorities that 
they have complied with any export limitations attached to the licence, 194 including having 
obtained the required consent from the originating Member State. 
 However, it may be argued that the ICT lacks any systematic means by which 
receiving Member States are routinely informed about relevant re-export conditions. 195 
Whilst it is the Member State’s obligation to implement Article 10 ICT, the recipient must 
might give rise to concern; and (b) the significance of the components in relation to the products in which they 
are to be incorporated. Both criteria are likely to provide scope for broad interpretation, in particular, 
“significance”. 
189 GRIP, supra note 5, at 60.  
190 Ibid. 
191 GRIP, supra note 5, at 61. This also means that harmonization of post-shipment controls is currently 
“inconceivable”.  
192 Ibid., at 60 reporting that only one Member States expressed this opinion and that: “it should be underlined 
here that this understanding of the certification as an alternative to the EUC is not a shared interpretation among 
Member States. However, this issue should definitely be discussed among Member States.”  
193 The authors are grateful to Baudouin Heuninckx for this observation. 
194 Recitals 34, 35, 36 and Article 10 ICT. This obligation corresponds with a prior obligation to ensure that 
suppliers inform recipients of limitations relating to end-use or export. See Recital 31 and Article 8(1) ICT. 
195 Taylor, EC Defence Equipment Directives, Standard Note SN/IA/4640 3 June 2011, House of Commons 
Library, 20 citing at fn. 49 Committee on Arms Export Controls, Scrutiny of Arms Export Controls 2009, HC 
178, Session 2008-09.  
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ensure compliance and inform the authority of any export limitations. Consequently, the ICT 
fails to safeguard against the risk of unauthorised export in cases where recipients 
intentionally or inadvertently neglect to inform their authorities. 196 The Commission had 
originally considered an IT traceability database that would track all licences and their 
eventual export restrictions. However, this option was considered to be less cost-efficient 
than the information requirements finally adopted.197 
 Whilst the current uncertainty of Article 10 ICT may be criticised, this provision must 
not be seen in isolation as the only available safeguard. As indicated in Section 6, 
certification is one means of addressing export control concerns. In addition, the ICT contains 
provisions on customs procedures to ensure a further final check on exports and their 
conformity with relevant administrative formalities before leaving the EU. 198 Further, as 
indicated in Section 7, Article 16 ICT also requires Member States to lay down penalties for 
infringements, in particular, in the event of false or incomplete information being provided 
concerning the recipient’s declaration of compliance with the terms of export limitations 
attached to the transfer, thereby incentivising compliance.199 
 
6. Certification  
It is recalled from Section 4.3.1 that the ICT requires Member States to use general licences 
where the recipient is a certified undertaking. 200 Thus, the introduction of a certification 
regime is the second fundamental innovation of the ICT. Certification concerns the 
assessment of the reliability of a prospective recipient of defence-related products under a 
general licence. This is conducted in the Member State in which it is registered according to 
common criteria before any transfer to that recipient takes place. The principal rationale is to 
ensure, in particular, the capacity of the recipient to comply with export limitations placed on 
transferred products. 201  Certain Member States operated their own national certification 
systems before the ICT.202 However, the need for common principles and mutual recognition 
required existing national processes to be overhauled. 
 
6.1. Optional certification and mutual recognition 
The legislator decided to establish a regime based on optional rather than mandatory 
certification.203 One significant argument against mandatory certification concerned the need 
for undertaking to weight the costs and benefits of certification in light of the manageable but 
still considerable costs of certification.204 The ICT singles out the potential for certification to 
benefit transfers within a group of undertakings where the members of the group are certified 
in their respective Member States of establishment.205At the very least, optional certification 
may incentivise Member States to grant general licences in light of the guarantees provided 
by certified reliability.206 It may also foster the conditions for mutual trust leading to mutual 
196 Ibid. 
197 Impact Assessment supra note 4, at 47. 
198 Article 11(1) ICT.  
199 See also Recital 38 ICT. 
200 Article 5(2)(b) ICT. 
201 Recital 33 and Article 9(2) ICT.  
202 French companies must obtain a “licence for manufacturing and trading” whilst UK companies are invited to 
implement a “compliance programme for exporters”: Impact Assessment, supra note 4, at 37. 
203 Impact Assessment, ibid., at 26-27 and 37-40. 
204 Data collected during the consultation phase from stakeholders suggests annual costs of about €10,000.00 per 
company if that company is already certified under ISO9001 (a known industry standard on quality 
management): Ibid at 38-40. See also Recital 32 ICT. 
205 See Recital 3 ICT. 
206 Impact Assessment, supra note 4, at 40. 
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recognition of certificates attesting reliability. For instance, Article 9(6) ICT provides that 
Member States must recognise any certificates issued in another Member State. 
 
6.2. Competent authorities 
Article 9(1) ICT requires Member States to designate competent authorities to certify 
recipients on their territory under general licences published by other Member States. The 
fact that, prior to the ICT, departments other than defence (e.g. ministries of industry or 
economy) were often in charge of certification was an argument against the adoption of a 
transfer regime under the auspices of the European Defence Agency (EDA) which is seen as 
an agency of Member States’ ministries of defence.207 At present, the fact that certification is 
optional may militate against calls for the centralisation of certification under a unit within 
the Commission or the EDA, for example. However, the certification regime is already 
undergoing a process of centralisation. According to Article 9(8) ICT, Member States must 
publish and regularly update a list of certified recipients and inform the Commission, the 
European Parliament and the other Member States. Further, the Commission must make 
publicly available on its website a central register of recipients certified by Member States 
and has created a central register or this purpose.208 In the long-term, further centralisation 
under an EU institution could be explored as a means to build further trust beyond mutual 
recognition, the arguments for and against falling beyond the scope of this article. 
 
6.3. Certification criteria, certification and publication 
As indicated, the ICT introduces common certification criteria to establish the recipient’s 
reliability. 209 These criteria appear to be exhaustive. The ICT also prescribes the minimum 
mandatory information to be contained in certificates.210 However, Member States may also 
provide that certificates contain further conditions relating to the provision of information 
required to verify compliance with the reliability criteria and concerning suspension or 
revocation of the certificate. 211  In addition, authorities must monitor the recipient’s 
compliance with the reliability criteria and with any further conditions at least every three 
207 Ibid. at 18. See also Transposition Report, supra note 5, at 10. In Germany this is the responsibility of the 
Federal Office for Economy and Export Control (Bundesamt für Wirtschaft und Ausfuhrkontrolle BAFA) which 
is operating under the supervision of the Federal Ministry for Economy and in the United Kingdom the Export 
Control Organisation under the Department for Business, Innovation and Skills. 
208 The Commission’s Register of Certified Defence-related Enterprises (CERTIDER) 
<http://ec.europa.eu/enterprise/sectors/defence/certider/> [last visited 16 March 2015] provides information 
about enterprises certified under the ICT, contains a list of the competent national authorities designated to deal 
with certification, the list of certified enterprises, details about the certificates and links to relevant national 
legislation. According to GRIP, most but not all Member States refer to the EU’s list of certified recipients and 
several Member States specifically require the supplier to verify, on the EU website, whether the beneficiary 
holds a valid certificate (GRIP, supra note 5, at 33 indicating, however, that the UK authorities refer to a list of 
certified companies available on a UK website). It is submitted that a guidance note or a revised ICT could 
specify that all references should refer to the EU list of certified recipients. Modifications to the overall design 
and update of CERTIDER are also a necessary addition to improve information content (GRIP, ibid., at 63). 
209  These criteria are: proven experience, taking into account, in particular, the undertaking’s record of 
compliance with export restrictions; relevant defence industrial activity, in particular capacity for (sub)system 
integration; the appointment of a senior executive personally responsible for transfers and exports; a written 
commitment of the recipient that it will take all necessary steps to observe and enforce conditions relating to the 
end-use and export of any specific component or product received; a written commitment that it will provide 
detailed information in response to requests and inquiries concerning the end-user(rs) of all products exported, 
transferred or received; and a description of the recipient’s internal compliance programme or transfer and 
export management system. See Article 9(2)(a)-(f) ICT. 
210 Article 9(3)(a)-(d) ICT.  
211 Article 9(4) ICT. 
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years.212  Finally, the validity of a certificate must not exceed five years.213 Therefore, it 
appears that, notwithstanding common certification criteria, it is unclear whether Member 
States may issue certificates for less than five years up to the maximum. Further, Member 
States may differ in terms of the nature and level of information required to verify 
compliance and may monitor compliance more often than every three years. 
 In order to ensure further convergence in the applicable certification critieria, the 
Commission has published Recommendation 2011/24/EU214 setting out common certification 
guidelines but which may, in fact, create further diversity of national measures contrary to the 
ICT’s intended objectives. In certain respects, the guidelines not only amplify existing 
provisions but also leave scope for Member States to add further requirements, the 
proportionality of which might be questioned. It is not clear what has motivated this choice. 
The fact that certification is currently optional may be one reason why the ICT has opted to 
encourage convergence through a separate instrument that will be retained even under a 
revised ICT. It could equally reflect a view that the ICT’s certification provisions have not 
achieved a sufficient degree of harmonisation, the Recommendation constituting an interim 
measure pending its formal incorporation into expanded certification provisions under the 
ICT. Whatever the reason, the Recommendation was not specifically envisaged or enabled by 
the ICT. The co-existence of a legally binding instrument and a non-legally binding 
Recommendation compromises legal certainty. Whilst caution must be exercised against 
substantially increasing the ICT’s content in light of its minimum harmonization objective, 
additional certification provisions are arguably necessary under a revised ICT to clarify the 
criteria drawing on certain of the Recommendation’s provisions where necessary.215 
 
6.4. Non-compliance 
If a competent authority determines that a certified recipient on its territory is no longer 
compliant, it must take “appropriate measures”, which may include revoking the 
certificate.216 It follows that measures other than revocation may be used such as temporary 
suspension. Uncertainty in determining what might constitute an instance of non-compliance 
and appropriate action may have the consequence that authorities simply opt for automatic 
revocation or suspension, irrespective of the gravity of the violation without considering the 
possibility of less severe corrective measures. There is no mechanism in the ICT for Member 
States to achieve a relative degree of uniformity in approach, other than an obligation to 
inform the Commission and other Member States of the decision taken.217 Recommendation 
2011/24/EU provides some indication as to how to proceed in assessing non-compliance, 
appropriate measures and determinations and time limits regarding the lifting, maintaining or 
revoking of suspensions. 218 On issues that might be considered to fall within the area of 
national procedural autonomy, EU law principles of proportionality and effective judicial 
protection will need to provide a residual safeguard in the absence of more specific provision. 
212 Article 9(5) ICT. This provides an additional safeguard to that provided in Article 8(3) ICT which requires 
Member States to regularly check that suppliers keep detailed and complete records of their transfers. 
213 Article 9(3) paragraph 2 ICT. 
214 Commission Recommendation 2011/24/EU of 11 January 2011 on the certification of defence undertakings 
under Article 9 of Directive 2009/43/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council simplifying terms and 
conditions of transfers of defence-related products within the Community [2011] OJ L11/62. The 
Recommendation was developed by the working group under the Committee procedure in Article 14 ICT. 
215 Whilst operating close to the sphere of national transfer policies and national procedural autonomy, there are 
certain issues concerning the suspension, revocation and termination of licences and certificates that could 
similarly be addressed in more detail or at least further clarified in a revised ICT. 
216 Article 9(7) ICT. 
217 Article 9(7) ICT. 
218 See, for example, Section 4(4.1) and Section 4(4.3.).  
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6.5. Transposition, implementation, and impact  
Member States have put in place the framework to certify recipients, appointed competent 
authorities, established reliability criteria, “in general” foresee mutual recognition of 
certificates and instituted compliance monitoring and corrective mechanisms.219 However, 
there has been a limited impact in practice.220 Firstly, companies, in particular, SMEs express 
“serious doubts” about the practical benefits of certification given the time, risks, potential 
for intellectual property and security breaches and organisational and financial requirements 
necessary to prepare procedures, controls and audits for compliance.221 Secondly, there are 
potentially unknown costs and risks. For example, concern has been expressed regarding the 
certification criterion which requires a senior officer to be personally responsible for transfers 
and exports.222 Further, the consequences (in particular legal) for a company of not being 
certified were considered unclear. 223  Thirdly, lack of visibility of certification and the 
absence of sufficient harmonisation has limited confidence in the regime. For instance, the 
uncertain scope of application of general licences and the fact that it is not mandatory to 
publish licences and certifications in a common language such as English, has, in turn, 
impacted the assessment of whether or not recipients should seek certification.224 Overall, 
only a small number of companies have so far been certified.225   
 Recognising that it will take time for Member States and the defence industries to 
develop trust and confidence in the regime, there are a number of issues that could be 
addressed in the short term. Firstly, a principal motivation for this article has been the relative 
absence of any public visibility of the ICT regime; greater and clearer publicity of the ICT 
certification regime is required given its corresponding impact on the uptake of general 
licences and vice versa.226 Secondly, Member States and prime contractors should take the 
initiative to encourage the uptake of certification at lower levels of the supply chain.227 
Thirdly, certain criteria require clarification and reconsideration. For instance, the 
requirement for a designated officer to be “personally responsible” is only likely to make 
licencing officers even more risk averse.  
 
 
7. Safeguards for Member States and undertakings 
Appropriate safeguards for Member States and suppliers and recipients are vital in an area as 
politically sensitive as defence. However, as will be discussed, under the ICT, clear priority is 
given to the former over the latter. 
 Concerning Member States, the ICT envisages the possibility to enact suspensory 
measures. Firstly, Member States may withdraw, suspend or limit the use of transfer licences 
issued at any time on four grounds: protection of their essential security interests; public 
219 Transposition Report, supra note 4, at 11.  
220 GRIP, supra note 5, at 43. 
221 Ibid., at 40 and 44. According to GRIP, at 46, the administrative burdens and lack of information on general 
licences led some SMEs to use individual and global licences in the alternative. 
222 This had been identified as an issue within the export community as compliance programmes become 
increasingly mandatory and sophisticated. Thanks to Mr. Ian Bendelow for discussions on this point, although 
this was not expressed as a UK specific concern given the UK’s historical experience of using compliance 
programmes. This is also reiterated in GRIP, supra note 5, at 44. 
223 Ibid., at 44. 
224 GRIP, supra note 5, at 45.  
225 Ibid. See also The impact of the ‘defence package’ Directives on European Defence, supra note 5, at 43 
observing that only 38 certified defence companies are listed on CERTIDER and that “one must hope a 
significant acceleration of the rate of certification will occur in the coming months or the entire project of the 
EC to positively impact the European defence market may be at risk of failure.” 
226 GRIP, supra note 5 at 46-47. 
227 Ibid., at 46. 
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policy; public security; and non-compliance with licence terms and conditions.228 Secondly, 
as indicated in Section 6.4., the Member State of a certified recipient may take corrective 
action in relation to non-compliance with certificates which includes suspension of a 
certificate.229 Thirdly, Article 15 ICT enables a Member State to take pre-emptive measures 
to provisionally suspend the effect of a general transfer licence where a licencing Member 
State considers that there is a “serious risk” that a certified recipient will not comply with a 
licence condition, or that public policy, public security or its essential security could be 
affected. Before suspension, the Member State must request verification from the recipient’s 
Member State230 and, if doubts persist, 231 impose suspension.232 The suspending Member 
State may also decide to lift the suspension where it considers that it is no longer justified.  
Again, such determinations leave discretion to Member States but at the risk of variable 
national approaches to suspension.  
 Concerning undertakings, as indicated, the ICT does not contain any dedicated 
provisions enabling, for example, a supplier to challenge decisions regarding a Member 
State’s choice to only grant a particular type of licence limited to certain types of product,233 
or to refuse to grant a licence, or to challenge the basis for suspending or revoking a licence 
or certificate. The absence of any consideration of review of remedies in the preparatory 
documents, reports and studies may reflect the sense that such issues are at the heart of 
Member State transfer policies and national procedural autonomy. It is therefore unsurprising 
that the ICT’s provisions simply require Member States to lay down penalties for 
infringements.234 The ICT indicates that the current deferment to Member States on this issue 
is necessary for the progressive building of mutual trust.235 Notwithstanding, it is possible to 
bring claims for judicial review of licencing decisions under national administrative law. An 
open question concerns the level of judicial scrutiny that will be applied under national law.It 
must also be acknowledged that, prior to the ICT, the variable use of penalties and 
enforcement was a point of criticism.236  It is therefore unclear whether future ICT revisions 
will include specific provisions clarifying use of suspensions as well as penalties. 
 
 
8. Conclusions 
The “Defence Package” imposed new harmonising regimes on a sector so far substantially 
unregulated by EU Internal Market law. The ICT seeks to cut through the fog of hazy claims 
that public policy and security concerns justify disparate and disproportionate national 
licencing procedures. Whilst it is possible to debate the extent to which legitimate risks to 
security do arise from transfers of defence products within the EU, it is difficult to refute the 
claim that such transfers generally pose a lesser risk than exports to third countries outside 
the EU. The ICT’s main innovations are: (1) a transition away from individual licences 
228 Article 4(9) ICT. 
229 As referenced in art.9(4)(b) ICT. 
230 It is unclear to what extent verification will satisfy the licencing Member State especially if the recipient 
Member State has limited understanding of the circumstances. There is also a risk that verification simply 
becomes a formality, suspension having already been determined on the basis of an assessment of risk rather 
than evidence. Further, the ICT  does not prescribe measures which may result after verification but which fall 
short of provisional suspension.  
231  This appears to indicate the presence of a “reasonable doubt”: Recital 39 ICT.  
232  The suspending Member State must then inform the other Member States and the Commission of the 
reasons: Article 15(2) ICT. 
233 However, Recital 20 ICT indicates that Member States should determine the recipients of transfer licences in 
a non-discriminatory way unless necessary for the protection of their essential security interests. 
234 Article 16 ICT. See also Recital 38 ICT. 
235 Recital 38 ICT. 
236 UNISYS, supra note 4, 62-3. 
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towards general licences for the intra-Union transfer of defence products defined according to 
the EU’s CML and subject to reduced ex ante controls; (2) certification of recipients 
accompanied by monitoring; and (3) ex post controls on export outside the EU.  
 However, this article has revealed that the ICT’s approach to harmonisation has 
ultimately impacted the operational effectiveness of the regime. Firstly, the ICT seeks to 
harmonise national measures in an area in which Article 36 and Article 346 TFEU also 
operate raising questions as to the compatibility of the ICT with primary EU law. Legal 
uncertainty is not aided by the fact that the EU law compatibility of transfer licencing 
measures had hardly been tested prior to the ICT and has not since its coming into force. 
Secondly, Member States continue to exercise considerable discretion not least because the 
ICT purports to simplify rules and procedures but is without prejudice to national transfer and 
export policies. Thirdly, the ICT is ambivalent with regard to the level at which to set the 
floor of harmonisation, an example being the borderline between optional exemption from 
prior authorisation and mandatory licencing. Fourthly, whilst the ICT sets minimum 
standards, the supplementary Recommendation on certification is perhaps indicative that the 
ICT is not, itself, achieving the required level of harmonisation. Finally, Member States 
continue to exercise considerable discretion regarding information requirements and 
compliance measures. These decisions are only subject to the general constraints of EU 
Treaty principles. Uncertainty in the objectives and extent of harmonisation further 
exacerbate broader underlying concerns felt by suppliers and recipients as to whether, on a 
cost-benefit analysis, licencing and certification are worthwhile.  
 The above are also concessions to an overriding export control mentality which 
continues to pervaded the structure of the ICT regime. From the very outset, export risks may 
determine the type of licence and products to which a licence is subject, so far leading to 
discrepancies in the application of the CML. Concerns regarding export risks have continued 
to legitimate the retention of individual licences. Further, the ICT’s certification regime and 
guidelines would not look out of place in an export compliance programme manual. There 
also continues to remain a diversity of national practices regarding end-use controls which do 
not sufficiently differentiate end-uses within the EU from end-uses outside the EU. 
 Notwithstanding, the ICT is a first iteration revealing the current limits of 
harmonisation and use of the regime by Member States and undertakings. This provides 
institutional learning for future revisions. Whilst this article has identified certain areas which 
may be amenable to further harmonisation, the political reality in the short to medium term 
must qualify expectations about future levels of harmonisation. The late exercise of EU 
competence in this area renders the regime susceptible to the same kinds of difficulties 
encountered when exercising a new competence: both are exercised for the first time, both 
legislators and stakeholders are in need of adaptation, with experience and mutual trust and 
recognition only growing over time. This may also explain the ICT’s approach to 
harmonisation, its “particularly arduous” transposition, 237 and the extent of its current and 
potential impact. There is currently a stalemate between Member States accustomed to their 
own licensing cultures and anxious to safeguard against re-exportation risks and the private 
sector cautious to calculate the costs, benefits and risks associated with a wholescale 
transition to general licences. At the present stage of development of EU defence integration, 
it must be candidly acknowledged that intra-EU transfers are still considered to present 
security risks which legitimate certain controls. Over time, Member States need to ensure that 
licencing decisions are a true reflection of risk. Whilst a licence-free Europe may never be 
possible, the ICT, backed with institutional support at the national and EU levels may lead to 
a more licence-friendly Europe in an Internal Market for defence goods.  
237 The impact of the ‘defence package’ Directives on European Defence, supra note 5, at 43. 
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